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Despite extensive expenditures for flood control, there have been con-
tinued catastrophic flood losses in recent years. These losses accentuate
the need for land-use regulation in flood plains.' Flood-plain zoning is one
method that has been accepted on the municipal and county levels as a
valid tool for the reduction of such damage. However, for flood-plain
zoning to be most effective, it should be administered and enforced on
the state level. In several states, including Illinois, the power to adopt
flood-plain zoning has been delegated to lower governmental bodies. The
state, however, still retains the option of withdrawing such power and
exercising it directly. This should be done if flood-plain zoning is to be
an effective preventive remedy.
In spite of the vast expenditures that have been made for flood control
purposes, losses from floods total millions of dollars annually and are in-
creasing every year.2 This increase in flood damage has been attributed
in part to an actual increase in the number of floods,8 but the larger part
of the increase has been caused by the "continuing human encroachment
upon flood plains. ' 4
After a careful analysis of the increased costs of flood damage between
1903 and 1951, Hoyt and Langbein reported that:
Of the increase in reported property damage by flood, we may ascribe about
45 per cent to the increase in property values, 25 per cent to an increase in the
amount of flooding, and 30 per cent to an increase in building and other uses
on flood-hazard lands.5
1 The term "flood plain" is used here to mean "any area of bottom land subject to
flooding by stream overflow." White, The Control and Development of Flood Plain
Areas 95, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING
(1961).
2 LEOPOLD & MADDOCK, TiE FLOOD CONTROL CONTROVERSY-BIG DAMS, LITTLE D2rms,
AND LAND MANAGEMENT 83 (1954). See also Interstate Conference on Water Prob-
lems, Water Policy Committee, Subcommittee Reports, p. 4 (December 5-6, 1960).
Flood losses may be defined as "the destruction or impairment, partial or complete,
of the value of goods or services, or of health, resulting from the action of flood
waters and the silt and debris they carry." HOYT & LANGBEIN, FLOODS 77 (1954).
3 HOYT & LANGBEIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 88.
4 White, Strategic Aspects of Urban Flood Plain Occupance 86, Journal of the Hy-
draulics Division, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers (February,
1960).
5 HOYT & LANGIBEIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90.
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At the present time, "about 10,000,000 people in the United States prefer
to reside and/or work on some 50,000,000 acres of land subject to occa-
sional inundation." 6 Thus, the magnitude of the flood problem is primarily
the result of unimpeded encroachments by man upon flood plains.7 Several
ways of arresting this rising trend of flood losses have been suggested:
broadening the range of choice in making adjustments to flood hazards;"
more modern engineering works; land elevation; flood proofing;9 various
emergency measures; public relief and flood insurance. Of major im-
portance is the growing acceptance of using flood-plain land-use regu-
lation to control further encroachment. 10
Discussion of land-use regulation of flood plains may be said to have
begun with a deceptively simple and appealing question in the Engineering
News Record of March 1937:
Is it sound economics to let such property be damaged year after year, to res-
cue and take care of the occupants, to spend millions for their local 'protec-
tion,' when a slight shift in location would assure safety?"
Now it is generally accepted that "net flood losses cannot be reduced by
engineering works alone but that land-use planning and regulation is an
essential part of an effective national program for loss reduction .... -12
Methods of regulating land use in flood plains presently include: en-
croachment or floodway statutes, zoning ordinances, subdivision regula-
tions, building codes, urban renewal, and warning signs.'8 The method
with which we are here primarily concerned is zoning.
Old. at 187.
7 WHITE, CHANGES IN URBAN OCCUPANCE OF FLOOD PLAINS IN THE UNITED STATES,
University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 57 (1958).
8 Id. at 232. The full range of possible adjustments is examined in WHITE, HUMAN
ADJUSTMENT To FLOODS, University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research
Paper No. 29 (1942).
9 See SHEAFFER, FLOOD PROOFING-AN ELEMENT IN A FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION PRO-
GRAM, University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 65
(1960).
10 See, e.g., MURPHY, REGULATING FLooD-PLAIN DEVELOPMENT, University of Chicago,
Department of Geography Research Paper No. 56 (1958).
11 Engineering News-Record 385 (March 11, 1937).
1 2 WHITE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94. See generally MILLER, FLOOD DAMAGE PRE-
VENTION FOR TENNESSEE, Tennessee State Planning Commission (November, 1960);
MOORE, PLANNING FOR FLOOD DAMAGE PREVENTION, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Engineering Experiment Station, Special Report No. 35 (1958).
'
8 For a good discussion of the probable constitutionality of regulations effecting
sound land use in floodable areas where the rational relationship between such regu-
lations and the public benefit is demonstrable, see Cooter, To Stay Out of Floods,
NATIONAL Civic REViFW, Vol. L, No. 10, pp. 534-39 (November, 1961).
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FLOOD-PLAIN ZONING
The constitutionality of zoning as a proper exercise of the police power
has been established for some time.14 The general principle of zoning
ordinances was first held constitutional and not violative of the due process
clause in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.15 While their
application to particular situations is sometimes held so arbitrary as to
violate the due process clause,16 zoning ordinances have been held valid
in virtually every case in which the zoning was reasonably related to the
public health, safety, or general welfare. 17
Since a zoning ordinance imposes a restriction on the use of private
property, to be valid it must be a proper exercise of the police power.
It was decided in the landmark Illinois case of City of Aurora v. Burns,',
that zoning was such a proper exercise of the police power if the zoning
ordinance was reasonable. Thus, the test of whether a zoning ordinance
is valid or not, is whether it is reasonable in relation to the general public
welfare.
A zoning ordinance that may be valid in and of itself may be invalid as
applied to a particular piece of property. For example, a dispute may
arise as to whether a particular piece of property has been properly placed
in a particular zone rather than whether the use classification of the
zoning ordinance is itself valid.19 Similarly, a zoning ordinance may not
restrict a piece of property to a use for which it is totally unsuited because
this would amount to confiscation and would therefore be unconstitu-
tional. 20
Flood-plain zoning is much the same as other city or county zoning,
14 See McQuillin, Constitutional Validity of Zoning Under the Police Power, I1
ST. Louis L. REV. 76 (1926). See also Byrne, Constitutionality of a General Zoning
Ordinance, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 189 (1927); Baker, Constitutionality of Zoning Laws,
20 ILL. L. REv. 213 (1925); and Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REv.
834 (1924).
15 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
16 See, e.g., Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). See also Ribble, Due Process
Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV.
689 (1930).
17 For example, it has been pointed out that during the period from January, 1954
to May, 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance in 23 of
30 cases. Babcock, The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 175-6
(1957).
18 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
'9 See 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E. 2d 827
(1946), and cases cited therein.
20See, e.g., County of Du Page v. Halkier, 1 111. 2d 491, 115 N.E. 2d 635 (1953);
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 111. 2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953).
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except that it has a somewhat different objective or purpose, that is, the
zoning of the flood-threatened areas along the stream. It is a means of
regulating the use of land and the type of structures which may be erected
thereon by placing land subject to flood in a separate district with certain
restrictive use provisions aimed at minimizing flood damage. Those areas
closest to the stream subject to flooding which would be hazardous to
human life are placed in one district. Areas farther from the stream and
with less hazard are zoned accordingly, in much the same manner as city
or county zoning.21
As a legal concept, flood-plain zoning is, in most of its aspects, not
revolutionary. However, due to the fact that almost all of the ordinances
have been enacted since 1949,22 judicial construction of them is extremely
sparse.
The leading case is American Land Company v. City of Keene.23 In
1925 the city of Keene, New Hampshire, sold 32 acres of land to the
plaintiff, who proposed to develop and subdivide it for residences. The
mayor had indicated that it was suitable for residential sites and could be
sewered, despite the fact that about 28 acres of it was lowland near the
Ashualot River. A branch of the river ran through a corner of the land
and nearly every spring the ice in this branch broke up earlier than in
the sluggish river into which the branch emptied. This resulted in the
annual or periodic flooding of much of the real estate in question, making
it entirely unfit for residential purposes. After the plaintiff had subdivided
the land and sold several of the lots, the city amended its zoning ordinance
(1927), classifying this land in an "Unrestricted District" category in
which no dwelling house could be erected without the consent of an
adjustment board. As criteria, the board was to use the health and safety
of the occupants and the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.
At the trial in the federal district court the principal issue was whether
the land was fit for residential purposes. After the city showed that the
land was subject to flooding at certain periods of the year and was not
susceptible of good drainage, the court held the ordinance constitutional
and a valid exercise of the police power. The trial court then denied a
post-trial amendment to the complaint seeking relief on the ground of
fraud. On appeal both majority and dissenting opinions agreed there had
been a valid exercise of the police power. As the dissent put it, this was
21 For a Model Flood Plain Zoning Ordinance Amendment and analysis thereof, see
BEUCHERT, A LEGAL ViEw OF THE FLOOD PLAIn 57-77 (1961). See also MuRPHY, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 175-89 for a comprehensive collection of flood-plain provisions in
zoning ordinances.
22 See MuRPHY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 56-70. Of the 49 flood-plain zoning ordi-
nances listed in the tables, only four were enacted prior to 1949.
23 41 F. 2d 484 (Ist Cir. 1930).
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"an eminently proper exercise of the city's police powers in order to
protect possible purchasers from being victimized-as the plaintiff was
victimized by the city itself."24
It is seen, therefore, that the ordinance itself was not one of flood-plain
zoning; such was just the particular application of it in the Keene case.
This, however, does not substantially lessen its value as legal precedent,
despite the element of fraud. The denial of the permit was based on flood-
plain zoning, and this was upheld under the police power in spite of the
general criteria specified for the granting of the permit.
Beuchert discusses what appears to be the only other case dealing with
flood-plain zoning, Sevier Terrace Realty Co. v. City of Kingsport.25 In
1957 the Tennessee legislature added to the general grant of zoning
power 26 the following amendment:
Special districts or zones may be established in those areas deemed subject to
seasonal or periodic flooding, and such regulations may be applied therein as
will minimize danger to life and property, and as will secure to the citizens of
Tennessee the eligibility for flood insurance under Public Law 1016, 84th Con-
gress or subsequent related laws or regulations promulgated thereunder. 27
Later the same year the defendant adopted an ordinance which set up
floodway channel districts, varying from 40 to 65 feet on each side of the
centerline of Reedy Creek and prohibited the construction, alteration or
extension of any building or structure, as well as dumping and the per-
manent storage of materials within the said districts.28 The plaintiff, who
owned unimproved real estate within such a district and so was restricted
in the use of his land according to the terms of the ordinance, brought
suit for declaratory judgment. Since the plaintiff asserted that Chapter
306 resulted in an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation or due process of law, the Attorney General became a
party. This aspect of the case was heard separately. The Attorney Gen-
eral, besides relying on the Keene case and that the prevention of fraud
and deceit is part of the police power, argued that the same reasons which
permit zoning to be used to protect persons and property from the dan-
gers of fire apply also to floods. The Chancellor held that the state law
was a reasonable exercise of the police power and stated that he could see
little difference between flood zoning and the usual type of zoning law.
24 American Land Co. v. Keene, 41 F. 2d 484, 490 (1st Cir. 1930).
25 No. 7172, Ch. Sullivan County, Tennessee, October 29, 1959, an unreported case
discussed in BEUCHERT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 51-53.
26As contained in TENN. CODE ANN. S 13-401 (referring to quarterly courts) and
S 13-701 (referring to municipalities) (Supp. 1960).
27:T.NN. AcS 1957, ch. 306. .
2s Kingsport, Tenn., Zoning Ordinance,-§§ V-V (1957); MURP'HlY, Op. cit. supra
note 10, at 185.
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The validity of the city ordinance has not yet been passed upon, but since
in its nature it seems to be more of an encroachment-type law rather than
zoning in the sense here used,29 a decision on it may not have special legal
significance. These two instances are the extent of case law dealing direct-
ly with flood-plain zoning.80 As was mentioned above, this is attributable
mainly to the fact that flood-plain zoning is of such recent development.
A very thorough analysis of the constitutionality of flood-plain zoning
was made by Allison Dunham in 1959 in his article Flood Control Via the
Police Power.31 Dunham specifically rejected basing validity on the phrase
"to promote health, safety, protect property and promote the general
welfare" or some other comprehensive phrase. Rather he discussed the
four reasons commonly given for flood-plain regulation: 1) Individual
choices result in unwise land use patterns in a flood plain; 2) Individual
choices result in land uses which obstruct a flood flow so as to damage
other land users in the use of their own land; 3) There is not really a
rational choice, and therefore the individual land user must be protected
against being "victimized" to the damage of his health, safety or property;
4) Individual choices result in land uses which require expensive public
works such as reservoirs and levees or require costly disaster relief when
the floods come, so that restriction on choice will promote welfare by
reducing public expenditures. He concluded that the first reason by itself
lacks legal basis, but that the other three reasons are supportable.8 2
Dunham dismissed the first reason on the basis that the police power
has traditionally been used to prevent one from using his property in a
manner that would injure another or be damaging to the community as a
whole; whereas, it may be suggested that the exclusion or restriction of
uses in areas subject to flooding is a device protecting a person from his
own acts, and as such lies outside the scope of the police power.3 It is not
felt, however, that the regulation of flood plain uses within the frame-
29 The basic intent of encroachment and flooding statutes is to prevent encroach-
ment upon or obstruction in the stream channels themselves that would restrict their
width or otherwise increase flood heights and velocities. See MURPHv, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 19-34, 165-74.
30 Beuchert mentions two other cases which touch upon the area indirectly but
which as he points out are clearly distinguishable from flood-plain zoning in its nor-
mal sense: Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261
S.W. 2d 619 (Ky. 1953); and Konitz v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnson County,
180 Kan. 230, 303 P. 2d 180 (1956). BEUCHERT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 53.
81 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959).
32 Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098, 1110-17
(1959).
38 See WERTHEIMER, FLOOD-PLAIN ZONING-PossmILITIES AND LEGALITY WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO Los ANGELE CoqNTrY, CALIFORNIA 30, California State Planning Board
(June, 1942).
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work of a comprehensive zoning plan is solely, or chiefly, an action pro-
tecting one from the consequences of his own acts, but almost necessarily
involves the protection of other land users and the public as well. 4
As to the third reason, it is very possible that those who wish to build
in the flood plain may not have knowledge of the flood risk involved.
The fact that such a possibility exists makes the regulation of flood plain
uses in the interest of both the individual and the public. In cases where
the builder is not to be the ultimate owner, it is certainly a proper exercise
of the police power to protect possible purchasers from being victimized.85
Dunham also examined the last three reasons for the validity of flood-
plain zoning from a due process viewpoint and found little difficulty with
them as long as the legislation in question indicates that these were the
true reasons for passage.88
The construction of protective devices such as dams and levees as a
method of reducing flood damage will, in many cases, enhance the market
value of the property protected. On the other hand, the placing of use
restrictions on areas subject to flood will, in many instances, reduce op-
portunities for land speculation and may bring out the real value of the
land affected. This fact alone causes many objections to the use of the
police power to prevent or reduce flood damage in lieu of protective
works. The lowering of market value, however, has been held not to be a
valid argument against the proper use of the police power.8 7 As to the
extent of diminution of market value that will be permitted, the courts
generally hold that to sustain an attack upon the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance, the aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance
is enforced the consequent restriction precludes its use for any purpose to
which it is reasonably adapted.8 Provision must be made for existing uses,
however, since zoning must not be retroactive.8 9
In the final analysis each ordinance setting up a land-use regulation
must, in the words of the courts, "be reasonable and not arbitrary." The
principal criterion as to the reasonableness of flood-plain zoning ordi-
nances involves a determination of the extent of the flood hazard. In
other words, the regulations must bear a reasonable relation to the engi-
34See SILER, FLOOD PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTION THROUGH URBAN PLANNING PRO-
GRAMS 14, Tennessee State Planning Commission (1955).
85 See American Land Co. v. Keene, 41 F. 2d 484 (1930).
36 DUNHAM, supra note 32, at 1123-28.
87 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), property worth $800,000 as a brickyard, $60,000 for resi-
dential purposes; Geneva Investment Co. v. City of St. Louis, 87 F. 2d 83 (8th Cir.
1937); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931).
88 See the cases collected in Annots., 117 A.L.R. 1129 (1938); 86 A.L.R. 671 (1933).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, S 3151 (1961).
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neering data. In order to be reasonable the area, extent and elevation de--
terminations of the land placed in the flood plain zone should be based
upon: historical evidence of flooding; a computed frequency of floods; an
engineering study of flood potential; an analysis of the degree of flood
protection afforded by other methods of regulation; the degree of flood
protection offered by engineering structures and whether or not develop-
ment in the immediate future will increase or lessen the runoff.40 The uses
to be permitted on the land subject to flooding should also take into con-
sideration the anticipated growth of the area and the availability of non-
flood land sufficient for the needs of the community.41
Once a legislative finding of fact as to flood hazard has been made, al-
though not conclusive upon the courts, it will be accorded judicial con-
sideration and deference.42 Therefore, there appears to be no legal reason
why flood-plain zoning is any different from any other type of zoning
except for the rather extensive amount of engineering research which
must be conducted in order to determine the area and elevation of the
land to be included in any such district.
STATE FLOOD-PLAIN ZONING
At the present time the primary responsibility for the preparation and
enforcement of flood-plain zoning regulations rests upon local govern-
ments. Of the communities that have authority to plan and zone, however,
not all are taking advantage of the powers available to them,4 3 and some
are even hostile to their use. Such hostility is usually justified on the the-
ory that community planning, zoning and other regulations infringe on
the right of the individual to exercise free choice in the use of his prop-
erty and therefore should be opposed for the preservation of individual
liberty.
Alany local governments do not have and cannot afford to employ com-
petent professional and technical personnel to enable them to relate the
flood situation to development problems and to prepare suitable zoning
40 See Barrows, "Legal Aspects of Flood Plain Zoning," Paper presented at the
thirty-third meeting of the Northeastern Resources Committee, September 13, 1960.
For a good analysis of the methods available for the identification and evaluation of
flood and land-use factors which should be considered in planning for flood damage
prevention so that the most reasonable type of flood-plain regulation will be deter-
mined, see MOORE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 10-28.
41 See White, op. cit. supra note 1. See also WHiTE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENTS TO
FLOODS, University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 29
(1942).
42 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); People v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E. 694
(1933).
43 Murphy noted that as of July, 1958, only 49 cities and counties in 15 states had
adopted flood-plain zoning ordinances. MURPHY, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 55-59.
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provisions to guide and control land use in flood plains. Likewise, many
cities do not have sufficient trained personnel to administer and enforce
such regulations. Although responsibility for enforcement is local, the
impact of poor enforcement is often regional and sometimes even state-
wide. Awareness of this extra-territorial effect of flood-plain zoning ad-
ministration caused Klar in 1960 to comment:
[E]ven with the very best of flood plain zoning, inevitably the streams which
may give rise to such flooding in one community pass through other commu-
nities first. If suitable measures are not taken upstream, the community which
is conscientiously trying to do the best for its citizens may find itself thwarted
in its program. This obviously speaks for regional planning-if not regional
zoning.44
On the county level there is the so-called problem of "leakage." County
zoning ordinances restrict land uses only in the unincorporated areas of
the county. Many landowners in unincorporated areas, upon finding them-,
selves restricted in the use of their property by county zoning ordinances,
have had little trouble in having their land reclassified to some less restric-
tive use upon its annexation to an adjoining city or village. Needless to
say, this practice, if widely adopted, would vitiate the effectiveness of any
conscientious program of county zoning for the reduction of flood dam-
age.
Many of the difficulties encountered by the local administration of
flood-plain zoning could be substantially alleviated and the objective of
flood-plain land-use regulation more effectively achieved by the wider
adoption of the concept of regional or state flood-plain zoning.
A recent and extensive study, conducted by Morse to determine the
role of the states in guiding land use in flood plains, concluded that the
states have a major responsibility for regulating land use in flood hazard
areas. 45 This conclusion was based upon the fact that federal agencies do
not have the requisite authority and that local governments cannot con-
trol land use in those portions of the flood plains which extend beyond
their local government jurisdiction. Authority to regulate land use, in-
cluding the flood plains, resides in the states. The federal government does
not have this authority except on federally-owned land. Cities and coun-
ties do not have such authority except as it is granted to them by the state.
The states, therefore, hold the key to responsible action for regulating
flood-plain development. The study strongly recommends that the state's
44 Klar, "Flood Plain Zoning in Urban Renewal'and Regional Planning Program,"
p. c 12. Paper presented at the thirty-third Meeting, Northeastern Resources Com-
mittee, Berlin, Connecticut, September 13, 1960.
45 MORSE, ROLE OF THE STATES IN GUIDINc LAND USE IN FLOOD PLAINS, Tennessee
Valley Authority and the. Graduate Program. in City Planning, Georgia Institute. .of
Technology, Special Report No. 38 (June, 1962). .
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role in a comprehensive state flood damage prevention program include
state regulation of land in flood plains.48
With the exception of encroachment and floodway statutes47 none of
the states, except Hawaii, has directly exercised their authority to regu-
late land use in flood plains. Instead, they have authorized cities and coun-
ties to adopt .and enforce such regulations. The State of Hawaii has
adopted in principle the concept of state zoning. One of its objectives is
to establish conservation districts for the prevention of floods and soil
erosion.
The Hawaii State Legislature passed Act No. 187, in June, 1961, author-.
izing the state to establish land-use zones within the state for those uses to
which they are best suited for the public welfare and to create a comple-
mentary tax assessment program that would encourage rather than.penal-
ize persons who would develop uses that are best suited for the public
welfare. The act created a State Land Use Commission consisting of seven
members. One member is appointed from each senatorial district and one
member is appointed at large. The Director of the Department which is
responsible for administering the act and the Director of the Department
of Planning and Research serve as ex-officio voting members.
The State Land Use Commission is directed by the act to establish three
major classes of use to which all lands in the state shall be put: urban, agri-
culture and conservation. The Commission is empowered to group con-
tiguous land areas suitable for one of these three major uses into a district
and designate it as an urban district, agriculural district or conservation
district.
The act further provides that zoning powers are granted to counties
and that the counties shall govern the specific zoning within the three
types of districts, except that areas may not be zoned for urban uses ex-
cept in those districts that are designated as urban districts by the State
Land Use Commission. The act also provides that the Commission shall
prepare and furnish each county with copies of classification maps for that
county showing the .district boundaries adopted in final form by the state.
The Commission is required to adopt in final form not later than
twenty-four months from the effective date of the act, regulations pre-
scribing the permitted uses in the various classes of districts. The counties
are responsible for determining the specific location of permitted uses
within the districts.
As opposed to the act passed by the Hawaii State Legislature, the Ten-
nessee State. Planning Commission has prioposed enactment of a state flood-
plain -zoning. statute that would provide a temporary interim solution- to
46 Ibid. at X. 47 See note 29 supra.
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regional or "extra-territorial" flood-plain zoning problem.48 To permit
zoning of flood hazard areas currently unserved by local planning agencies,
this act would permit the state, through the State Planning Commission,
to use its police power to promulgate zoning on flood-plain areas. The
proposed statute provides procedures for the certification of a zoning plan
of a flood district by the State Planning Commission to the Secretary of
State's office. A public hearing would be required in the county where
the district is to be established. The act provides for a board of appeals to
be appointed by the governor. Administration and enforcement of the
zoning would be the responsibility of the office of a State Building Inspec-
tor within the State Planning Commission. This office would administer
such zoning districts, issue necessary building permits, provide required
inspections and enforce compliance with the zoning ordinance as passed.
The general concept outlined in this proposal merits consideration and
study because it would seem to provide a reasonable basis for protecting
areas not served by a local planning commission, or for encouraging local
action.
State zoning regulations for areas not served by a planning commission
would cease after a local planning commission has been established, local
zoning regulations adopted and provisions made for a building inspector
and an appeals board to administer and enforce such local zoning regula-
tions. Therefore the provisions of this act do not apply where flood dis-
trict zoning is already in effect or where a county court or chief legislative
body of the municipality has already adopted a zoning resolution or ordi-
nance with flood-plain provisions.
Since the proposed legislation does not establish any minimum zoning
standards that the localities must meet before the state zoning regulations
are terminated, a local government could apparently adopt a zoning ordi-
nance for the express purpose of avoiding state controls.4 9
WITHDRAWAL OF PREVIOUSLY DELEGATED POLICE POWER
The power to zone, which carries with it police powers for the enforce-
ment of zoning provisions, rests initially with the state. This police power
48 MILLER, FLOOD DAMAGE PREVENTION FOR TENNESSEE 68, 71-78, Tennessee State
Planning Commission (November, 1960).
49 As another example of state regulation, the Alabama State Health Department re-
cently adopted policies for approval of subdivisions in flood plains. These regulations
provide that "Approval cannot be given to any subdivision which lies wholly below
the fifty-year flood stage. Where a subdivision is located partly above and partly
below the fifty-year flood stage, the portion of the area above the flood stage may be
approved, provided it satisfies all the requirements of the sanitation regulations and
subdivision criteria." Alabama State Health Department, "Policies on Approval of
Subdivisions in Flood Plains," p. 1 (July, 1961).
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was assigned to the states in the federal constitutioni ° and has never been
delegated to the federal government; it may be, and is, delegated by the
states to its various political subdivisions.
Municipalities and counties, being local governments, have only such
powers as are granted to them by the legislature. Their corporate authori-
ties have no power as to zoning or other matters except as such power is
given to them by statute.51 In Illinois the General Assembfyr is the gov-
erning body of the state and is the sole constitutional repository of legis-
lative power.52 The only legislative powers municipalities have are those
delegated to them by the General Assembly.
In 1959 the Illinois General Assembly amended its municipal zoning
enabling act5 3 so as to expressly empower municipalities to enact flood
plain regulations. The act now reads in part:
To the end that ... the hazards to persons and damage to property resulting
from the accumulation or runoff of storm or flood waters may be lessened or
avoided ... the corporate authorities in each municipality have the following
powers, within the corporate limits or in contiguous territory not more than
one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits and not included in any
municipality . . . to establish, regulate and limit . .. the building or set-back
lines on or along any ... storm or floodwater runoff channel or basin. .... 54
A substantially similar amendment to the county zoning enabling act 55
authorized counties to enact zoning regulations for this same purpose.56
The above amendments represent a delegation of police power to Illi-
nois municipalities and counties to effect the desired regulation. Such a
delegation of authority has not proved particularly motivating to the mu-
nicipalities and counties of the several other states which have similarly
empowered their lower governmental bodies to enact flood-plain regula-
tions.57 An alternative to such regulation on a municipal and county level
would be to have flood-plain zoning effected and enforced either by the
state itself or by a special state commission. By using such an alternative
many of the difficulties encountered on a local level, such as the shortage
of competent professional and technical personnel, local hostility and re-
calcitrance and the problem of leakage, could be substantially overcome.
Having once delegated an attribute of its police power to municipalities
50 U.S. CONST. anend. X.
51 See Matthews, The Power to Zone in Illinois, 1954 U. ILL. L. F. 167.
52 ILL. CONST. art. iv, § 1.
53 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1961).
54 Ibid. 55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1961).
56 11 Laws of Illinois 1959, p. 1653, § I (municipalities); 1I Laws of Illinois 1959,
p. 1676, S1 (counties).
57 See note 43 supra.
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and counties, the issue which presents itself is whether the Illinois Legis-
lature has the power to withdraw such delegated power and, upon re-
suming it, either exercise it directly or confer it upon an administrative
body.
The general legal doctrine, supported by an unbroken line of authori-
ties, is held to be that the delegation of powers of local self-government is
wholly within the discretion of the legislature and may be abridged or
abrogated at its pleasure.5 8 The legislature may withdraw such powers
conferred on municipal corporations in whole or in part and resume them
in whole or in part, and may either return such powers to itself or vest
them in other agencies, such as special commissions.5" It follows as a gen-
eral rule that the state legislature, unless restricted by the constitution,
may withdraw previously delegated police power and exercise it directly
or provide for its exercise by some other duly constituted agency.0° In this
connection, the inalienable character of the police power of the state pre-
vents the legislature from irrevocably parting with it in whole or in part
in favor of any municipal corporation.6' Such rule has been often recog-
nized by the Illinois courts.
In a quo 'warranto proceeding to determine the constitutionality of the
1949 Hospital District Act,62 People ex rel. Royal v. Cain,63 the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the act attempted to vest in the
newly created hospital districts power and jurisdiction coextensive with
that of counties. Had this argument been accepted, both political entities
would have purportedly had the power to levy taxes against identical
property for identical purposes, in violation of the due process clause of
the Illinois Constitution.6 4 The court, however, took notice of the fact
that the act specifically provided for the cessation of operation of any
pre-existing public agencies authorized to own and maintain public hos-
pitals and to levy taxes therefor. In its opinion the court quoted People ex
rel. Greening v. Bartholf65 where the Illinois Supreme Court had said:
58 For authorities and for the constitutional development of municipal home rule,
see McBAiN, LAW AND PRAcTicE OF MUNICIPAL HoME RULE (1916); and McBain, Doc-
trine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 299
(1916). (This doctrine is utterly refuted in the United States.) See also McGOLDRICK,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME Rum, 1916-1930 (1933).
59 See gencrally 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORtrioNs ch. 4, § 4.05 (3rd ed. 1949).
6o City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919).
61 Milwaukee Elec. Ry. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n, 238 U.S. 174 (1915). See gener-
ally 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.ch. 24, § 24.42 (3rd ed. 1949).
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 163.30-.50 (1949)..
63410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E. 2d 74 (1951). 64 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
65 388 IH. 445, 463, 58 N.E. 2d 172, 180-81 (1944). Quoted in People ex rel. Royal v.
Cain, 410 III. 39, 51, 101 N.E. 2d 74,80 (1951).
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'The Constitution contains no prohibition against the creation by the legislature
of every conceivable description of corporate facilities, and the endowment of
them, when created, with all the faculties and attributes of other pre-existing
corporate authorities .... In the organization of park districts located within
the jurisdiction of an existing municipal corporation which had the power to
create and maintain parks, this court has adhered strictly to the principle that
the General Assembly has the power to withdraw from a municipal corpora-
tion a power previously given, and confer it upon another municipality.6 6
It also pointed out that this same principle was reiterated in People ex rel.
Curren v. Wood,67 where the court sustained the validity of a provision
of the Airport Authority Act of 1945 specifying that a newly created
airport authority shall succeed to the interest of any pre-existing public
airport, located within the corporate limits of the authority.
The case of Anderson v. Nick08 concerned the continued validity of an
1889 prohibition ordinance of the town of Lake which had been granted
certain protection by the Illinois Annexation Act.69 In holding that the
rights of cities and villages with respect to the prohibition and regulation
of the sale of alcoholic beverages were now subject to the Illinois Liquor
Control Act,70 the court stated:
A municipal corporation created by a State which has been delegated the exer-
cise of a police power has noprivilege to continue exercising the police power
after the legislature has manifested a different intention with reference to the
exercise thereof.71
With respect to a private corporation the court held that where the legis-
lature had given the University of Chicago the power to prohibit the sale
of liquor within a prescribed area, such power could be revoked at the
pleasure of the legislature because the police power of the state could not
be subject to an irrevocable grant.7 2
In Kizer v. City of Mattoon,78 the exclusive power of regulation as to
the storage, keeping and sale of gasoline and volatile oils, previously
lodged in cities and villages, 74 was held to have been withdrawn by super-
ceding state'laws7 5 and vested in the department of trade and commerce.
O People ex rel. Royal v. Cain, 410 II. 39, 51, 101 N.E. 2d 74, 80 (1951).
67 391 Ill. 237, 62 N.E. 2d 809 (1945). 60 Laws of Illinois 1889, pp. 66, 75.
68 402 111. 508, 84 N.E. 2d 394 (1949). 70 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 194 (1961).
71 Anderson v. Nick, 402 I11. 508, 514, 84 N.E. 2d 394, 398 (1949).
72 Dingman v. People, 51 111. 277 (1869).
73 332 I1. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928).
74 Illinois Cities and Villages Act, art. 5 S 1, clause 65 (Smith's Stat. 1927, p. 340).
75 Laws 1919, p. 692 "AN ACT to regulate the storage, transportation, sale and use of
gasoline and volativc oils," and Civil Administrative Code, § 56 (SMITI-Huv RV.
S'rA. ch, 1273, 1927).
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The court pointed out that where the state delegates to a municipality the
power to pass ordinances, the state may resume such power through legis-
lative action and thus deprive the municipality of the right to exercise it.
Other powers similarly held to have been expressly withdrawn from mu-
nicipalities possessing them under the Illinois Cities and Villages Act in-
clude the power to exact a license fee from master plumbers, 76 and the
power to license and tax foreign insurance companies. 77
The Illinois Public Utilities Act,78 which created the Illinois Com-
merce Commission, and vested in it exclusive power over the regula-
tion of public utilities, has been interpreted as having impliedly with-
drawn from cities and villages certain powers previously delegated under
the Cities and Villages Act. Powers held to have been so withdrawn in-
clude the powers to pass regulations concerning: the speed of trains with-
in corporate limits; 79 the separation of grades by railroads at highway
crossings;80 the scales and weights of freight shipments;8' the use of
streets, alleys and public places by public utilities; 82 the maintenance of
flagmen at railroad crossings; 3 the equipping of street railroads with
brightly lighted headlights; 4 and the equipment and operation of street
cars in the city of Chicago.8 5
Thus, aside from situations where police powers previously being exer-
cised by, or merely residing in, counties and municipalities have been held
to have expressly withdrawn by superceding state statutes,86 the Illinois
courts have frequently recognized that such police powers may also be
withdrawn by implication.87 Withdrawals of police power and repeals of
statutes and ordinances by implication, however, are not favored. It is
76 Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N.E. 1004 (1900).
77 City of Chicago v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 Il1. 276, 18 N.E. 668 (1888).
78 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111 (1961).
79 Hemphill v. Wabash R. R., 209 F. 2d 768 (1954), cert. denied 347 U.S. 954 (1954);
City of Vitt v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 324 Ill. 494, 155 N.E. 325 (1927).
80 City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 356 Ill. 501, 190 N.E. 896 (1934).
81 City of Chicago v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 348 Il1. 193, 180 N.E. 835
(1932).
82 Chicago N. S. & M. R. R. v. City of Chicago, 331 III. 360, 163 N.E. 141 (1928).
83 Village of Atwood v. Cincinnati, I. & W. R. R., 316 111. 425, 147 N.E. 449 (1925).
84 Northern Trust Co. v. Chicago Ry., 318 I1. 402, 149 N.E. 422 (1925).
85 City of Chicago v. O'Connell, 278 Il. 591, 116 N.E. 210 (1917).
86 E.g., Anderson v. Nick, 402 111. 508, 84 N.E. 2d 394 (1949); Kizer v. City of Mat-
toon, 332 Ill. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928); City of Chicago v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 Il. 276,
18 N.E. 668 (1888).
87 E.g., City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 356 Ill. 501, 190 N.E. 896
(1934); City of Witt v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 324 II1. 494, 155 N.E. 325 (1927);
Villagc of Atwood v. Cincinnati, 1. & W. R. R., 316 Ill. 425, 147 N.E. 449 (1925).
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only where there is a clear repugnance between two laws and the provi-
sions of both cannot be carried into effect that the later law must prevail
and the former be considered repealed by implication.8 Even where two
statutes are enacted which have relation to the same subject, the earlier
continues in force unless the two acts are clearly inconsistent with or re-
pugnant to each other, or unless in the later statute some express notice
is taken of the former plainly indicating an intention to repeal it.89
As a rule of construction, two statutes which are seemingly repugnant
to each other should, if possible, be so construed that the subsequent act
may not operate to repeal by implication the earlier act.90 In all such
cases it is the intention of the legislature to impliedly withdraw the pre-
viously delegated power that is the controlling factor.91 The repeal by
implication of one act by a later act is not effected by mere conflicts or
inconsistencies between them, but occurs only where the carrying out of
the later act prevents the enforcement of the former. To the extent they
are in conflict the first act is repealed, but the parts of the first act not
affected remain in full force and effect.92
Similarly, while municipal ordinances must be in harmony with the
general laws of the state, and in the case of conflict the ordinance must
give way, the mere fact that the state has legislated upon a subject does
not necessarily deprive a lower governmental body power to deal with
the subject by ordinance. 93 This is particularly true where the statute it-
self provides that the ordinance may prevail within the municipality 94 and
s8 People v. Burke, 313 I1l. 576, 145 N.E. 164 (1924).
89 Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 148 N.E. 69 (1925); Town of Ottawa
v. County of La Salle, 12 111. 339 (1851).
90 City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co., 378 Ill. 506, 39 N.E. 2d 26
(1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 670 (1942); Dugan v. Berning, 11 111. 2d 353, 143 N.E.
2d 547 (1957).
91 City of Chicago v. Walden W. Shaw Livery Co., 258 Ill. 409, 101 N.E. 588 (1913).
Compare Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 I11. 237, 87 N.E. 1073 (1909) and People v.
Sargent, 254 Ill. 514, 98 N.E. 959 (1912) with City of Chicago v. Walden WV. Shaw
Livery Co. supra.
92 City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co., 378 I11. 506, 39 N.E. 2d 26
(1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 670 (1942), the power vested in cities to permit or refuse
a license or franchise to a public utility, held not to have been withdrawn by the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor
& Com'rs of City of Danville, 367 Ill. 310, 11 N.E. 2d 388 (1937), the power vested
in cities to permit or refuse a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors to groceries
or meat stores, held not to be repugnant to nor withdrawn by the Liquor Control
Act; City of Geneseo v. Shearer, 326 Ill. 82, 157 N.E. 28 (1927), the power vested in
cities to pave, by special assessment, streets over which state bond issue road passes,
held not to have been withdrawn by the Hard-Surfaced Road Act.
93 Concrete Contractors' Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. Village of La Grange Park,
14 I11. 2d 65, 150 N.E. 2d 783 (1958).
94 City of Chicago v. Michalowski, 318 111. App. 533, 48 N.E. 2d 541 (1943).
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the statute not be operative therein.9 5 This principle was applied in two
very recent Illinois cases with respect to a general zoning ordinance of
the City of Rockford which included certain procedural requirements for
its amendment, in addition to, but not inconsistent with, those of the
statute,96 and a Cicero ordinance regulating trailer camps.9 7
Several of these principles have already been applied in cases concerning
the validity of zoning ordinances. For example, a federal court in Florida
held that a Florida statute which prohibited the erection, maintenance or
operation of any filling station, public garage or mercantile establishment
on Bayshore Boulevard, and within an area contiguous thereto in the city
of Tampa, superceded two ordinances of the city of Tampa forbidding
such building in the area, and stood above them as paramount and con-
trolling.98 It has likewise been accepted that the power of the state over
the subject of zoning being supreme, local zoning regulations, ordinances
or by-laws may not contravene the statutes or general law of the state,9°
and, in the event of conflict between the two, the local zoning regulations,
to the extent of such conflict, must yield. 100
CONCLUSION
Flood-plain zoning is valid as a proper exercise of the police power.
This power to regulate land uses in flood plains rests initially with the
state. The states may delegate this power to lower governmental bodies,
as in fact they have in several instances. The administration of flood-plain
zoning on a local level has encountered the difficulties of insufficient pro-
fessional and technical personnel, local recalcitrance and the problem of
leakage. To overcome these difficulties and to give recognition to the
extra-jurisdictional aspect of flood-plain zoning, it is recommended that
flood-plain zoning be effectuated on the state level. Illinois has already
delegated the power to effect such regulation to Illinois municipalities and
counties. The Illinois General Assembly, however, has the option of with-
drawing this power and exercising it either directly or through a special
administrative body. For the more effective administration of flood-plain
zoning it is suggested that this option be exercised.
95 See Kizer v. City of Mattoon, 332 Ill. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928).
96 Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 111. 2d 488, 182 N.E. 2d 219 (1962).
97 Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 35 111. App. 2d 456, 183 N.E. 2d 40 (1962).
98 Texas Co. v. City of Tampa, Florida, 100 F. 2d 347 (5th Cir. 1938).
99 David v. Board of Appeals of Reading, 333 Mass. 657, 132 N.E. 2d 386 (1956);
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A. 2d 362 (1952);
State v. Accera, 36 N.J. Super. 420, 116 A. 2d 203 (1955).
100 United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A. 2d 362
(1952); Attorney General v. Inhabitants of Town of Dover, 327 Mass. 601, 100 N.E.
2d 1 (1951); Bennett v. Board of Appeal of City of Cambridge, 268 Mass. 419, 167
N.E. 659 (1929).
